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This paper reports on results of surveys of hundreds of students in Italy, Ireland and the 
United States  that show that if simply confronted with questions about their preferences 
for high relative income at the expense of absolute income that  a) a substantial fraction 
give inconsistent answers and b) that the remainder are overwhelmingly status conscious. 
It also shows that where they are given more information about the benefits of higher real 
income that there is a significant decrease in this preference for status. The results are 
remarkably similar in all 3 countries and what differences exist are consistent with what 
we know about their differences in intergenerational income mobility. It also shows that 
when the price of status is changed American students response is highly inconsistent 
with any fully formed preferences for status. This is somewhat less so in Italy. Overall 
the results throw doubt on one of the empirical linchpins that has been used to bolster the 
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I.   Introduction   
There has been a considerable amount written that purports to show that a 
person’s relative income position motivates economic behavior and affects individuals’ 
perceived welfare or happiness levels.  The proponents of this position infer from this 
that, in a sense, the creation of private income and consumption are external bads that 
should be discouraged and that public projects that create goods for all that are non- 
positional should be subjected to less stringent cost-benefit criterion than commonly 
used. 
Part of this analysis is based on the idea that people derive pleasure from higher 
relative income because it gives them status and status is a zero sum and wasteful game. 
Congleton (1985), Lee (2006) and Greene and Nelson (2006a) call those assumptions 
into question.  If status is achieved by activities that create goods for others, and there is 
substantial evidence that it is, then no such conclusions about excessive private income 
creation follow. 
One of the linchpins on which those who argue for the idea that it is relative 
income that determines human welfare is a body of evidence from surveys that reveal that 
individuals say they would prefer to be in societies where they are relatively rich to 
societies where their purchasing power is higher but they are relatively poorer.  In a 
previous paper Greene and Nelson (2006b) argue that there is a difference between 
statements about what choices one would prefer and actual choices and that the actual 
choices imply that relative income is far from overriding importance.  They also present 
evidence from surveys of large numbers of students taking economic courses in the 
United States that the conclusion that it is relative income that counts is due in part to 
respondents in such questionnaires providing answers that they can infer the researchers 
want, and in part respondents having little information.  They show that the very high   3 
percentage of answers that display relativistic preferences are significantly reduced if 
more complete information is available. 
Such results might be peculiar to the United States population sampled and we are 
unaware of data on the subject elsewhere.  This paper looks not only at students in the 
United States, but also those in Ireland and Italy to see whether these same conclusions 
can be generalized to at least a few more locations.  In Section 2, we briefly discuss some 
differences in the distribution of income and intergenerational mobility in the different 
countries and why these could conceivably lead to differences in “relativistic” 
preferences.  Section 3 describes the surveys and samples in the different countries.  
Section 4 summarizes the results both via tables that show differences in proportion of 
students answering the questions in certain ways in the different countries  (probit 
regression results that explain choices by country and socio-economic characteristics are 
available on request).  Some concluding remarks follow. 
 
II.  Income Inequality, Attitudes Toward Inequality and Intergenerational 
Mobility in the Respective Countries 
There are some factual and some attitudinal reasons to suspect that since income 
inequality, attitudes toward it, and intergenerational mobility differ as between the U.S., 
Ireland and Italy, so too might the responses to surveys designed to elicit whether 
students preferred to live as relatively rich people in a poor society or with more real 
purchasing power but in a society where they would be relatively poorer. 
Apparently the actual distribution of earnings is somewhat more unequal in the 
United States and quite similar in Ireland and Italy. Brandolini and Smeeding [2005] 
report distributions of disposable personal income in year 2000 with Gini indices of .368 
in the U.S. and .323 and .333 respectively in Ireland and Italy.  The ratio of median   4 
income in the 90th relative to the tenth percentile is reported as 5.5 in the U.S., 4.6 in 
Ireland and 4.5 in Italy.  Precisely what higher inequality could mean for preferences 
about relative income positions is hard to infer.   The greater inequality could mean that 
the issue of relative position might be more salient and people would be more strongly 
inclined to desire to be in relatively richer positions.  On these grounds American 
students might be inclined to be more relativistic.  At the same time the absolute income 
levels in the United States are a bit higher and to the extent that there is a declining 
marginal utility of absolute income this would tend to mean more weight given to other 
things including relative position. 
But some evidence also exists implying differences in attitudes about whether 
inequality is too great.  Osberg and Smeeding [2005] report survey results from the 
International Social Survey Program [ISSP].  In three surveys in the U.S. [1987, 1992, 
1997] the average percent that disagrees or strongly disagrees with the statement that 
income differences are too large in our country was nearly three times higher in the U.S. 
than in Italy [32.8% vs. 11%].  But on a scale of 1 to 5 (agree to strongly disagree) there 
was virtually no difference between support for the statement that “Large income 
differences are necessary for a country’s prosperity.”  The combined results would seem 
to imply Italians are willing to sacrifice more to reduce perceived inequality.  The 
implication for how they might respond to questions about the importance of relative 
income position for themselves is unclear, but one would suppose that if Italians were 
more concerned with inequality they would be more likely to want greater absolute 
income for themselves and everyone else rather than low absolute income but more for 
themselves.  Once again this could lead to a prediction of greater tastes for relative 
position in the U.S.  Unfortunately no data is reported by the ISSP for the Republic of 
Ireland.   5 
But the original reason we thought of extending the study of preferences for 
relative position to Ireland and Italy was an intuitive suspicion that the societies of 
Ireland, the U.S. and Italy possessed substantially different social structures. 1 The Celtic 
Tiger had recently experienced phenomenal economic growth, with the impression of 
fantastic intergenerational income mobility.  While the U.S. had a reputation for great 
mobility it had suffered recently [see more below] and probably was less than in 
contemporary Ireland.  Personal experience in Italy (it certainly seemed fewer 
professional acquaintances had experienced great class or income mobility) and the 
United Stated led us to the belief that Italy was a less mobile and more stratified society.  
Our hypothesis was that in immobile societies the lure of high relative income positions 
at the expense of lower absolute means would be stronger.  Low relative positions would 
mean low relative position for one’s children and grandchildren and vice versa. 
But is it really the case that there is less intergenerational mobility in Italy than in 
the U.S. and still more in Ireland?  While we cannot reach a definitive conclusion our 
intuitions seem correct.  Typically the way economists measure intergenerational 
mobility is to study the income or earnings of fathers and sons.  After early evidence of 
very substantial mobility in the U.S., Solon [1992]  pointed out something faulty in the 
evidence that was based  solely on annual incomes:  they are poor estimates of permanent 
income.  Income averaged over several years give better and smaller measures of 
mobility.  Piraino [2006] uses the Historical Database of the Bank of Italy from 1977 to 
2002 to provide an intergenerational income elasticity for Italy that can be compared to 
U.S. data.  It confirms the study by Checchi et al (1999) that found lower mobility 
between occupation and educational groups in Italy.  Using the two sample 
intergenerational variable technique pioneered by Angrist & Krueger (1992), Arellano 
                                                  
1  Another reason is one of the authors association with ICER in Turin, Italy and the National University of 
Ireland- Maynooth   6 
and Meghir (1992) and Bjorklund and Janti (1997) , Checchi et al.use a sample of sons 
who have reported their father’s economic and social characteristics and a sample of 
adult men (pseudo-fathers), whose age is consistent with the son’s actual ages, first to 
estimate an income equation for the “fathers” and then to regress the log of son’s income 
on the log of predicted father’s income. This procedure is not without problems since 
there will tend to be an upward bias if the instruments such as father’s education have a 
separate positive impact on son’s income.  Nevertheless, the bias should be present both 
in Italy and the U.S. and comparative conclusions can be reached controlling for son and 
father age. Piraino finds almost identical elasticities of son’s income with respect to 
father's of .51 in Italy and Bjorklund and Janti find as elasticity of .52 in the U.S.  Since 
the average ages of fathers and sons in the Italian sample are higher [sons average in the 
U.S. sample is 32 and in the Italian 37] and this tends to lead to higher elasticities, this 
seems consistent with the idea of intergenerational income mobility also being somewhat 
less in Italy. 
Results presented in Comi (2003) are consistent with the conclusion that Ireland is 
a much more mobile society than Italy.  She uses the European Household Community 
Household Panel to produce estimates of intergenerational earnings elasticity for father- 
son pairs for 12 European countries including Italy and Ireland.  Since the average ages 
of sons is much lower in these samples the intergenerational elasticities estimated are 
much lower than in Piraino.  While they do reveal elasticities even lower than Ireland for 
three countries (Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands), the elasticity estimated for Italy 
is nine times the level of Ireland’s and Italy’s elasticity is the highest of all twelve 
countries studied.  Comi also finds substantially higher elasticities in the U.K. than in 
Ireland (elasticities at least three times as high) implying that contemporary Irish society 
is more mobile than the United Kingdom.   7 
This last observation is important because there are no studies that compare Irish 
and American data using similar samples and methodologies.  Comparisons do, however, 
exist for the U.K. and the U.S.  Corak [2006] finds estimates that are reasonably similar 
with the U.S. mobility, only slightly (6%) less than the U.K. 
It seems fair to conclude then that intergenerational income mobility is strongest 
in Ireland and weakest in Italy. We hypothesize then that, on average, individuals would 
tend to be more conscious of their relative positions and more willing to forego higher 
purchasing power for rank in Italy than in the U.S., and in the U.S. than in Ireland if 
mobility is an important determinant of positional concerns. 
 
III.  The Form of Our Surveys 
One of the main pieces of survey evidence purporting to provide data showing the 
importance of relative income positions for individuals is the study by Solnick and 
Hemenway (1998)2. They surveyed 155 students and 79 staff and faculty at Harvard’s 
School of Public Health in 1995 to determine how important positional concerns were.  
One of the questions was whether the respondents would prefer to live in a society where 
the respondent had an income of $50,000 and the average person had an income of 
$25,000 or in one where one has income of $100,000 and the average person had an 
income of $200,000 (prices were specified as constant).  Many chose higher relative 
income over a higher income level in spite of the fact that that higher relative income 
came at a very big price in terms of real absolute income levels.  Among the 159 
students, 52% preferred the higher relative income; 35% of the 75 faculty and staff 
answered similarly.  The conclusion would seem to be that relative income and income 
levels are of approximately equal importance in determining decisions.   
                                                  
2 It was extended in Solnick & Hemenway [2005] to provide evidence that not only is relative income 
important, but that income is more positional than leisure (and goods compared to  bads,  private compared 
to public goods).   8 
There are several problems with this study.  There is a zero return to any 
respondent giving a correct answer to the questions of this survey (while there need not 
be a universally correct answer, there should be a correct answer for any given student).  
There is no incentive for the respondent to give careful thought to evaluating the 
alternatives. Nor do they in our survey described below. 
Even if a student gave careful thought, he has little knowledge of the world on 
which to base his assessments.  The difference between the response of students and staff 
is revealing in that regard.  The faculty and staff are considerably more knowledgeable 
than the students, and they responded to that knowledge by giving statistically 
significantly less weight to relative income than did the students.   
There is a third problem, which is probably more important than these others, 
though its size is magnified by the zero-award scenario that generated the first problem.  
There is a framing problem.  This survey was obviously about the relative importance of 
status – a survey that makes sense only if those designing the survey felt that status could 
be relatively important.  Students don’t need a survey to convince them that income 
levels are important.  But a respondent might well say, “if it costs me nothing, why not 
give the survey makers what they want.” 
These are possible objections to the Solnick and Hemenway study. Just listing 
these objections does not imply that they play a sufficiently significant role to vitiate the 
results.   We have created a survey of our own to show that the Solnick and Hemenway 
study probably exaggerates the relative income effect by not considering information 
levels.  We will show that the results taken for granted in the literature are not robust and 
that this is the case in all three countries. 
We have designed a survey that in many ways duplicates the Solnick and 
Hemenway survey.  Our survey was administered to all students attending the first day’s   9 
session of either Principles of Microeconomics or Principles of Macroeconomics at 
Binghamton University on January 26 or 27, 2004 and students doing the same on 
August 31, 2004.  Useable results involving answers to both questions were 673 and 632 
respectively.  To make the income figures comparable in real terms to Solnick and 
Hemenway, we raised them to $60,000, $30,000, $120,000 and $240,000 and asked 
simply:  “In the question below, there are three states of the world - you are asked to pick 
the one in which you most prefer to live,” with the same other wording as Solnick and 
Hemenway, 
State A]  your current annual income is $60,000 and others have $30,000 in   
      annual income. 
  State B]  your annual income is $120,000 and others have $240,000   
      in annual income. 
  State C]  your annual income is $120,000 and others have $120,000 in  
      annual income. 
  For some of the students in the September survey, States B’ and C’ were 
substituted for States B and C respectively, 
State B’]         your annual income is $90,000 and others have $240,000 in annual  
      income.  
State C’]  your annual income is  $90,000 and others have $90,000 in annual 
income. 
Students are, then, asked to choose first which option they most prefer and 
secondly which they least prefer.  The answer AB, for example, means that a student 
most prefers A and least prefers B.   States A and B are the real income equivalents of 
Solnick and Hemenway’s states, as is the question about which state the respondent most 
prefers. State C has been added, as has the question about which state one least prefers.    10 
These additions permit a richer treatment of respondent’s relative income preferences.  It 
also permits us to determine the proportion of answers that are inconsistent. 
Another big change from the Solnick, Hemenway format, however, lies in 
providing students different levels of information.  Students are randomly given surveys, 
which differ by the information provided in the instructions. We postpone discussing 
those differences until the results section below.  
In order to make international comparisons the surveys were also administered to 
students in principles of economics classes at the University of Turin in Italy in the spring 
of 2005 where the total sample size was 516 and at the National University of Ireland in 
Maynooth where the sample size totaled only 159.  Of course in Italy and Ireland the 
monetary figures were expressed in Euros and were 32,000 and 16,000 euro, 64,000 and 
128,000 euro and 64,000 euro for choices A B & C. Only in the U.S. and Italy was the 
cost of choosing high relative income varied. 
IV.  Survey Results 
1.  The Inconsistent Answers:  We regarded five of the possible nine answers as 
nonsense.  The most obvious cases are those where the students answered that they most 
preferred a state and least preferred that same state: AA, BB, or CC ,(  Table 1) 6% chose 
one of these answers in the U.S., 6.7% in Italy and 4.9% in the Republic of Ireland (in 
this first section we treat B’ and C’ the same as B and C).  
We also regarded two other answers as inconsistent with thoughtful choice. A 
student who answers AC asserts that he prefers high status at a very high price in income 
level terms but prefers low status (B) to equality at no cost to himself.  This answer 
makes sense only if some people found a big return to high status but were indifferent 
about having low status.  This attitude might work for an exaggerated version of the 
chimpanzees: if a males get all the returns to status and there is no return to being   11 
anywhere else in the pecking order not even a return in terms of the prospects of 
becoming an a male.  But the literature about humans seems to suggest, if anything, 
higher costs of low status than returns to high status.  Overall, 5.7% answered AC in the 
U.S., 3.9% in Italy and 2.7% in Ireland. 
We also found the answer BC similarly in consistent.  Someone so answering 
must most prefer high income with low status and least prefer high income with equality.  
This requires that low status is more desirable than high status.  4% answered BC in the 
U.S., 3.7% in Italy and 3.8% in Ireland.  In total, then, 15.6% of the U.S. students and 
14.2% in Italy and 11.4% in Ireland gave inconsistent answers.     
  What does this result mean? Students were making some effort to answer the 
questionnaire.  Even 15.6%, for example, is a far lower percentage than can be 
attributable to random answers.  That probability would be 5/9, or 55.5%.   Even the two 
less extreme answers of the inconsistent set, AC and BC had far lower percentages than 
for any of the sensible answers.  However, 15.6%, or for that matter 11.4% ,is not a 
miniscule number.  A substantial number of our students were either making little effort 
or do not know how to read.  It makes one wonder how many of the remaining students 
were answering without much thought.  The rest of our analysis excludes from the 
sample these inconsistent answers. It should be noted, however, that including them does 
not change our conclusions 
2.  The Demand for Status:  A far higher percentage of our students wanted to buy 
status than in the Solnick-Hemenway survey.  Their students were confronted with only 
two alternatives: A (high status, low income) and B (low status, high income).  Our 
students also had the alternative C (middle status, high income).  The equivalent of their 
students choosing A is our students choosing AB (high status preference) or CB 
(moderate status preference).  In both these cases A is preferred to B.     12 
Tables 2 and 3 report the number of AB, CB, CA and BA answers and the 
percentage with respect to the total number of consistent answers. Survey 1 and 5 (which 
is the variant of Survey 1 including Sate B' and C') provide the same information to 
subjects as Solnick-Hemenway. In these two surveys, 80.4% of the US students made the 
AB or CB choice.  In Italy this percentage was 85.1 and in Ireland 76.3 (the difference in 
the fraction choosing status and income is statistically significant in all three states)
3. 
Only 52% of the Solnick-Hemenway students chose positively.  The difference in 
behavior between our students and theirs is both big in itself and statistically significant.   
Why the difference?  We can think of two possible reasons.  First, their students 
were graduate students; our students were those taking an elementary undergraduate 
economics course.  Graduate students know more about the world than undergraduate 
students if for no other reason than they are older.  This interpretation is consistent with 
one of Solnick and Hemenway’s results. They found that faculty and staff had a far lower 
percentage of status buyers than their students: 33% compared to 52%. Again the former 
were the more knowledgeable. 
The second reason is more interesting.  We had C as an alternative, they did not.  
In terms of strict logic, that should make no difference in the choice between A and B.  
But that logic is compelling only if a student were only interested in revealing 
preferences that existed prior to the survey.  We suspect that most students have not 
thought about their status preferences prior to the survey, and they have no incentive and 
little time to do much thinking about those preferences during the survey (they had about 
10 minutes to answer the questions).  Under those circumstances the CB answer seems to 
be the safe answer.  It allows the student to give some weight to both status and high 
income, a nice moderate choice.  In consequence the sum of the AB and CB answers 
include a lot of students whose answers have little to do with their own preferences.  (We 
                                                  
3 The t-statistic for the equality of proportions in the US is 12.7, in Italy 12.1 and in Ireland 2.8.   13 
would suspect that at least some of the non-preference revealing answers in CB have no 
preferences or have CA or AC preferences, but not sufficiently strong to resist the 
temptation to appear moderate.) Later, we will investigate evidence that suggests that 
something peculiar in the framing of the questions is, indeed, at work.  
3. Inter-country differences:  Let us also consider inter-country differences.  The 
percentage choosing AB (High Status) or CB (Moderate Status) in all the surveys was 
highest in Italy (76.7% of all responses), smallest in Ireland: 61.1%.  In the U.S. it was 
67.5%.  The t-statistics on differences in proportion between Italy and Ireland was 2.9, 
between Italy and the U.S. was 3.5 and between the U.S. and Ireland 1.25.  This is 
consistent with our hypothesis that individuals would be more willing to forego higher 
purchasing power to obtain status in countries with less intergenerational mobility.  
4.  Information and Status Preferences:  In addition to Survey 1 (and its variant 
Survey 5), students were randomly assigned to three other surveys, which varied by the 
amount of information given. 
Survey 2 (status information):  Following phrase added:  “In all societies you will 
associate most closely with people who have income close to yours.  In richer societies 
you will be slightly more likely to associate with people with somewhat higher incomes 
and you will be aware of the average income of those you do not meet.” 
Survey 3 (real income information):  Following phrase added to information 
provided in Survey 1: “If you earn less than the average income in a society, you and 
your children will be more likely to have your income move up in the future than if you 
earn more than the average.  The higher the average income in the society the better the 
public services such as education, road maintenance etc. that you will receive.”   
Survey 4 (status and real income information): The phrases of both Survey 2 and 
Survey 3 added to the information of Survey 1.   14 
We would predict that an increase in the information by these particular surveys 
would increase the proportion of those choosing income levels over status.  The high 
income level choice should experience the greatest increase, while the high status choice 
should experience the greatest decline. 
When considering the U.S. results, one of the information differences by surveys 
had large impacts on student choices.  There were the same information differences 
between Survey 3 and Survey 1 on the one hand, and Survey 4 and Survey 2 on the other 
hand.  The difference between both sets of surveys were that students were told that there 
were ways by which living in an area with higher average income could enhance one’s 
own well-being. We’ll call this real income information. 
This information had a very significant effect on U.S. choices in both a statistical 
and magnitude sense. Table 4 provides the results of a simple linear probability model in 
which the percentage of answers AB, CB, CA and BA are explained by the different 
survey specifications.  The table also provides the tests of the statistical significance of 
the differences in results across surveys.  The omitted category is the baseline 
specification (Survey 1), therefore the estimated intercept in Table 3 corresponds to the 
response percentage reported in Table 3 for Survey 1. The other estimated coefficients in 
Table 4 are the differences in response percentages with respect to Survey 1. 
As one moves from High Status (AB) to Moderate Status (CB) to Moderate Real 
Income Level (CA) to High Real Income Level (BA) there is a perfect order of the effect 
of real income information whether one looks at the differences in choices between 
Survey 3 and Survey 1 or the differences in choices between Survey 4 and Survey 2.  The 
probability of this occurring by chance for both of these differences is extremely low -
.0017.  Furthermore, the differences in choices for each of the extreme options, High 
Status and High Real Income Level is statistically significant for each of the survey   15 
differences considered.  For example, the proportion of those choosing High Real Income 
goes up from just 3.5% in Surveys 1 and 5, the no additional information case, to 29% in 
Survey 3. 
This is also true in Italy. The proportions choosing High Real Income goes from 
3% in Surveys 1 and 5 to 22.2% in Survey 3.  The fraction choosing High Status 
decreases from 45.2% in Survey 1 to 22.2% in Survey 3. The same pattern appears in 
Ireland, where in Survey 1, none chose the high real income answer but in Survey 3, 
32.4% do so.  In the Irish data, the fraction of respondents choosing High Status 
decreased from 28.9% to 13.5%.  
The results are not nearly so impressive for the other kind of information 
examined: information that one’s status for most associations is only modestly affected 
by one’s income relative to average income.  We call this status information.  Status 
information affects Survey 2 relative to Survey 1 and Survey 4 relative to Survey 3.  The 
predictions about how choices should behave in response to this information would be 
the same as the predictions we made with respect to real income information unless one 
assumes that students generally possess this information, but not the real income 
information.  These predictions are only modestly realized for status information in the 
U.S.data.  There is a statistically significant reduction in the proportion choosing High 
Status, t= 2.17.  But, there is virtually no change, significant or not, in the proportion 
choosing High Relative Income Levels.  Table 4 reports the impact of status information 
and the corresponding standard error. In fact, the sign of the difference between Surveys 
3 and 4 are sometimes in the opposite direction from the predicted.  Instead, more than 
the entire decrease in the choice of High Status is explained by an increase in the 
proportion choosing Moderate Status when the differences between Survey 1 and Survey 
2 and the differences between Survey 3 and Survey 4 are combined.     16 
The Italian results provide similar results.  The percentage choosing High Status 
is 45.2% in Surveys 1, decreases to 23% in Survey 2 and falls slightly going from 3 to 4.  
In Italy as we go from Surveys 1 to 2 or from Survey 3 to 4, High Real Income does not 
change significantly.   
If we look at the Irish results they too show the much larger ( though because of 
the small sample size statistically insignificant drop in High Status as we go from Survey 
1 to 3 as opposed to going from Survey 1 to 2 and the much bigger rise in High Relative 
Income as we go from 1 to 3 as opposed to 1 to 2.  Moreover, in Ireland as we go from 3 
to 4 we see a drop in High Relative Income, and a rise in High Status.   
For all three countries, what is really significant, again, both in terms of statistical 
significance and in terms of magnitude, is the difference in the impact of our two kinds of 
information.  Real income information has a great impact on choices compared to status 
information and the former behaves exactly as predicted compared to the less clear 
effects of the latter.  What makes this result so interesting is that it seems incongruous 
with the thrust of the overall results.  If one took our results at face value, they would 
suggest that our students even in Ireland are obsessed with status, that they are willing to 
give up a lot of income in order to have higher relative income.  That would suggest that 
even in Ireland choices would be more sensitive to variation in information about the 
impact of relative income on status than it would be on information about real income. 
That is, suppose that status were more important than real income in determining 
utility then, information that leads to an x% decline in relative income’s effect on status 
should have a bigger impact on decisions than information that leads to x% decline in 
relative income’s effect on real income levels.  We believe, if anything, the status 
information should be more important in determining the effect of status than the real 
income level information is in determining one’s real income.  But, in fact, the real   17 
income information affects our students’ choices far more than the status information 
(once again it may be the case that students naturally possess the status information, but 
not the real income information and our conclusion is wrong). 
Why?  One possible answer is that our students are in fact far more concerned 
with their real income levels than they are concerned about their status, in spite of their 
answers that seem to suggest just the contrary.  Alternatively, both the responses to 
information and to the choices are largely responses to students trying to deduce what the 
experimenters want.  As discussed earlier, students might well choose status because they 
think the experimenters want them to choose status.  The real income level information, 
we suspect, will have a bigger impact on revising students’ views on experimenters’ 
desires than the status information.  The former explicitly gives reasons why the income 
level of others can increase one’s own real income.  The latter is couched in a more 
neutral matter.   
Without knowing what is commonly assumed to be the effect of the income of 
others on status, a student could not tell whether the additional information about status 
should increase or decrease a desire for higher income relative to average income.  In 
consequence, that information should have less effect in determining a student’s 
prediction of experimenters’ desires.  At the very least, the observed differential effect of 
status and income level information on choices should make one skeptical of the extent to 
which student answers to the choice between status and income levels reveal their true 
preferences.  
5.  Changing the Price of Status:  In the American and Italian survey we varied 
the increase in one’s own income that one could get by reducing one’s status.
4  Some 
students had the choice B’ rather than B and C’ rather than C in their choice.  Both B’ 
and C’ contained a lower own income gain from giving up the high status in A, an option 
                                                  
4 We did not do them in Ireland because of the small sample size.   18 
available to both sets of students.  Clearly, then, if status is important, more students 
should prefer A to either B’ or C’ than their preference for A over B and over C 
respectively.  C’ also reduces the amount that others get by the same amount that one’s 
own income declines compared to C.  If status is important that should also increase the 
number of students choosing C’ compared to those who choose C when the choice is B’ 
or B respectively.  
The information level chosen as the reference level for this experiment was that of 
Survey 1 – no additional information -- therefore the impact of reduced cost of status can 
be read directly in Table 4.  In Table 4 we label the case when B’ and C’ are substituted 
for B and C Survey 5. 
These predictions are not born out by our results in the United States. In the U.S. 
there are no statistically significant differences.  Moreover, the signs of the differences 
between Survey 1 and Survey 5 are partly mixed up. In fact, there is a slight decrease in 
the highest status result (AB) when the price of status goes down : 4.4%.  But that decline 
is more than matched by an increase in the moderate status choice (CB): up by 7.4%.  
The high real income choice (BA) barely moves with a decrease in the price of status, 
down 0.4%.  
In Italy our predictions are partly verified in the data. While there is no significant 
change in the fraction of students choosing High Status, there is a significant increase in 
those choosing Moderate Status, and a significant decrease in those choosing Moderate 
Real Income Level. It seems that in Italy preferences for status may exist and people may 
rationally respond to its reduced price.  The strong orientation toward relative status is 
corroborated by the findings that in Italy overall 76.7% make status choices.  This 
percentage is only 67.5% in the U.S. and 61.1% in Ireland.  
IV.  Conclusions   19 
This paper shows that past surveys of students about their positional concerns 
which implied very substantial concerns were marred both by framing and informational 
problems.  It does so using surveys of Americans, Irish and Italian undergraduates.  The 
four of the surveys reported on here allows us to measure the extent of inconsistent or 
surely less than thoughtful answers.  It is substantial in all three countries.  Again in all 
three countries, students' greater informational levels lead to a substantial reduction in 
those giving positional answers.  The reactions to different kinds of information throw 
substantial doubt on the idea that well-found positional concerns exist.  In Italy the results 
are also dependent on informational levels, but less damming to the contention that such 
positional concerns exist. 
Variations in the surveys in the U.S. and Italy that change the cost of choosing 
status tend to corroborate the conclusion that American students do not possess any well-
formed positional concerns.  On the other hand there is some evidence that, perhaps 
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 TABLE 1         %  INCONSISTENT RESPONSES 
 
      US    Italy    Ireland 
 
AA,BB or CC   6.0    6.7    4.9 
 
AC      5.7    3.9    2.7   
 
BC      4.0    3.7    3.8   
 
TOTAL    15.7    14.3    11.4 
 
 
TABLE 2. CONSISTENT RESPONSE NUMBERS 
 
    Type of response 
    AB  CB  CA  BA 












US           
US Total (All surveys)  1,305  425  456  247  177 
   Survey 1 (Baseline )  271  123  91  47  10 
   Survey 2 (Status information)  272  95  109  50  18 
   Survey 3 (Real Income Information)  269  67  67  57  78 
   Survey 4 (Status and real income info.)  281  53  102  62  64 
   Survey 5 (reduced cost of status)  212  87  87  31  7 
   Total Survey 1 + 5  483  210  178  78  17 
 
ITALY 
         
Italy Total (All surveys)  516  162  234  70  50 
   Survey 1 (Baseline )  126  57  44  20  5 
   Survey 2 (Status information)  99  23  59  13  4 
   Survey 3 (Real Income Information)  90  20  37  13  20 
   Survey 4 (Status and real income info.)  91  16  40  16  19 
   Survey 5 (reduced cost of status)  110  46  54  8  2 
   Total Survey 1 + 5  236  103  98  28  7 
 
IRELAND 
         
Ireland Total (All surveys)  159  33  64  39  23 
   Survey 1 (Baseline )  38  11  18  9  0 
   Survey 2 (Status information)  42  9  21  11  1 
   Survey 3 (Real Income Information)  37  5  13  7  12 
   Survey 4 (Status and real income info.)  42  8  12  12  10 
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TABLE 3 CONSISTENT RESPONSE PERCENTAGES 
 
  Type of response 
  AB  CB  CA  BA 







US           
US Total (All surveys)  32.6  34.9  18.9  13.6   
   Survey 1 (Baseline)  45.4  33.6  17.3  3.7   
   Survey 2 (Status information)  34.9  40.1  18.4  6.6   
   Survey 3 (Real Income Information)  24.9  24.9  21.2  29.0   
   Survey 4 (Status and real income info.)  18.9  36.3  22.1  22.8   
   Survey 5 (reduced cost of status)  41.0  41.0  14.6  3.3   
   Total Survey 1 + 5  43.5  36.9  16.1  3.5   
           
ITALY           
Italy Total (All surveys)  31.4  45.3  13.6  9.7 
   Survey 1 (Baseline)  45.2  34.9  15.9  4.0 
   Survey 2 (Status information)  23.2  59.6  13.1  4.0 
   Survey 3 (Real Income Information)  22.2  41.1  14.4  22.2 
   Survey 4 (Status and real income info.)  17.6  44.0  17.6  20.9 
   Survey 5 (reduced cost of status)  41.8  49.1  7.3  1.8 
   Total Survey 1 + 5  43.6  41.5  11.9  3.0 
         
IRELAND         
Ireland Total (All surveys)  20.8  40.3  24.5  14.5 
   Survey 1 (Baseline)  28.9  47.4  23.7  0.0 
   Survey 2 (Status information)  21.4  50.0  26.2  2.4 
   Survey 3 (Real Income Information)  13.5  35.1  18.9  32.4 
   Survey 4 (Status and real income info.)  20.8  40.3  24.5  14.5 
         
Total (All states and survey types)  31.3  38.1  18.0  12.6 
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TABLE 4. THE IMPACT OF STATUS AND REAL INCOME INFORMATION ON 
RELATIVE INCOME PREFERENCES (Linear probability models). 
US  AB  CB  CA  BA 






High Real Income 
Level 
Survey 2 (Status information)  -.103  .066  .007  .029 
  (2.62)  (1.63)  (0.22)  (1.06) 
Survey 3 (Real Income Information)  -.203  -.085  ..035  .253 
  (5.15)  (2.10)  (1.05)  (9.06) 
Survey 4 (Status and real income 
info.) 
-.264  .028  .048  .187 
  (6.75)  (.70)  (1.43)  (6.78) 
Survey 5 (reduced cost of status)  -.042  .076  -.030  -.004 
  (1.00)  (1.75)  (0.84)  (0.13) 
Constant  .454  .336  .178  .037 
  (16.26)  (11.64)  (7.41)  (1.87) 
R-squared  .04  .01  .09  .004 
Test Survey 2 = Survey 4          No            ***               No              *** 




       
Survey 2 (Status information)  -0.220***  0.247***  -0.027  0.001 
  (3.61)  (3.74)  (049)  (0.03) 
Survey 3 (Real Income Information)  -0.230***  0.062  -0.014  0.183*** 
  (3.71)  (0.92)  (0.30)  (4.69) 
Survey 4 (Status and real income 
info.) 
-0.277***  0.09  0.017  0.169*** 
  (4.47)  (1.32)  (0.36)  (4.33) 
Survey 5 (reduced cost of status)  -0.034  0.142**  -0.086*  -0.022 
  (58)  (2.22)  (1.91)  (0.59) 
Constant  0.454***  0.349***  0.159***  0.04 
  (11.3)  (7.93)  (5.30)  (1.60) 
R-squared  0.06  0.03  0.01  0.09 
Test Survey 2 = Survey 4  No  **  No  *** 




       


































R squared  .02  .01  .01  .13 
Test Survey 2 = Survey 4  No  **  No  *** 
Test Survey 3 = Survey 4  No  No  No  No 
NOTE: the omitted variable is the indicator variable for Survey 1 (baseline). The number of observations is 1,305 for the US, 
516 for Italy and 159 for Ireland.  P Vules in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 